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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
GERTRUDE ERICKSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VB.

G. A. BASTIAN
ROEAN BAST~"N",

AND

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal From Sixth Judicial District.
Wayne County
,
Honorable Henry D. Haye-s, Judge

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEI\fENT OF FACTS
Thi·s action was commenced to recover judgment and decree declaring the defendants to be in
default in the performance of the terms of an
agreement for the purchase of a farm, farm machinery and other personal property purchased by the
defendants from the plaintiff and for the recovery
of the posses·sion of the property covered by the
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contract. There was a judgment for the defendants. The court decreed that because of certain
alleged conversations prior to and at the time the
contract was entered into, the plaintiff had waived
her right to .repo·ssession.
The testimony and findings of the court show
that an agreement was entered into on August 25:
1938, by which the plaintiff agreed to sell and the
defendants agreed to purchase 100 acres of agricultural land's situated in Loa, Utah, together with
64 shares of water in the Fremont Irrig:ation Company, a new; modern five room home, and certain
personal property consisting of livestock, farming
implements, household furniture and , other personal property. A copy of thrs agreement is a~
follows: (Tr. 1-5; Ab. 31-32, 14).
AGREEMENT
This agreement, made and entered into by and
between Gertrude B·. Erickson, of Loa, Utah, party
of the first part, and G. A. Bastian and Roean
Bastian, his wife, of Loa, Utah, parties of the second part, WITNESSETH :
That party of the first part agrees to sell and
J.;·arties of the second pa;rt agree to buy the following de·scribed real estate:
Lot 1 (NE% NE1t)JJ of Section 1, Twp. 28
South, Range 2 East, containing 40 acres:
also commencing 0 rod East of S'W corner Lot 4, Section 31, to 27 South, Range
3 East, thence North 48 rods, East 71 rods,
South 48 rods ; west 71 rod\s to beginning,J
containing 21 acres; also Lot 4 of Section
6, Twp. 28 South, Range 3 East, S. L. M.,
containing 36.53 acres, together with all
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improvements thereon, and all water
rights thereunto pertaining, consisting of
64 shares in the Fremont Irrigation Company, 1 water tap in the Loa Water Work~
Co.; 1 light attachment in the Peoples
Light & Power Co., also all farm implements and machinery, 1 team and harness,
4 cows, 6 brood sow"s and 10 small pigs,
also all floor coverings and 1 heatrola, by
consent of both parties
for the sum of $14,000.00, payable as follows:
$2,000.00 more or less payable on or before February 1, 1939, and $1,000.00 each year payable on
February 1 of each year until the entire sum is,
paid, together with interest at the rate of 4 percent
per annum payable annually at the time the princlpal is paid;
It is understood that this land ·above described
is mortgaged to the California-Western States.

Life Insurance Company, and it is understood between both parties that whatever the amount of
this mortgage i's, the parties of second part agree
to assume and pay and the amount so paid shall be
deducted from the purchase price of $14,000.00 and
the balance shall be payable to party of the first
part as above outlined.
The partie·s of the second part are entitled to
all the crop on said land just as it stands this day,
~nd they are aHowed to take posses·sion on this date
of the land, improvements and water rights.
The parties of the second part agree that no
water, land or improvements shall be di·sposed of
by them until this contract is paid in full.
The parties of the second part shall be allowed
30 days grace in making the above payments, in
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the event that their lamb crop or other crops cannot be disposed of by February 1 of each year.
The parties of the second part agree to pay
all taxes and assessments against said land ana
water commencing with the year 1938.
In the event that the parties of the second part
shall default in the payment of either principal or
interest a·s above outlined, the first party shall
have the right to re-enter and take peaceable possession of said land and improvements, and of thi:::~
agreement and the warranty deed and all other
papers pertaining to this agreement.
This agreement and the warranty deed sh::1ll
be held in escrow in the Clerk '·s Office, inasmuch
as it is understood that the abstract of title and
water certificate are now held by the California
Western States Life Insurance Company.
It is understood that there is a second mortgage to State Bank of Wayne on said land and
water, which parties of second :part agree to com~
plete the payment of, and the amount so paid shall
be deducted from the first $2,000.00 payment to
party of the first part, payment to bank to be made
out of the 1938 crop on land.
GERTRUDE ERICKSON,
Party of the First Part
G. A. BASTIAN,
ROEAN BASTIAN,
Parties of the Second Part
All of the personal property, together with the
possession of the real estate, and growing· and harvested crops were delivered by the plaintiff to the
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defendants on the date of the contract. (Tr. 10-12;
Ab. 34, 17). At the time the po·ssession of the.
property was delivered there were large and bounteorrs crops gTowing· thereon, consisting of alfalfa
hay, grain and potatoes. The market value of the
crops harvested and gro·wing was approximately
$1500. The reasonable rental value of the home
on the premises wa·s $25.00 per month. (Tr. 14-15;
Ab. 36, 17). The plaintiff also delivered to the defendants one water tap share in the Loa Wa,ter
Works Company which entitled the defendants to
receive culinary water, also one light attachment
in the Beople '·s Light & Power Company, which
entitled the defendants to the use of light and
rower. The farm equipment consisted of .a nev{
mower, a new rake~ a disc harrow, two-way plough,
a hand plough, a Utah lay-off, a new manure
spreader, a rubber tired wagon, various extras for
farm machinery, a large number of logs and shed
posts, a large pile of fire wood, a team of horses and
harness, three cows, five brood sows and eighteen
small pigs, atso certain fixtures and furniture in
the home. (Ab. 18).
Ever since the date of the contract the defend,ants have had the use of all of the real and perRonal property; have used and occupied the home
thereon and received and applied to their own uses
all of the crops g-rown on the property in 1938 :and
1939 (Ab. 18). The defendants paid nothing 'to
the plaintiff at the time the property was delivered.
(Ab. 17).

It was ·stipulated between the parties that the
contract attached to the complaint, Exhibit A, is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a true copy of the contract between the parties;
that the notice attached to the supplemental complaint and marked Exhibit B is a true copy ·of the
notice served on Mr. and Mrs. Bastian on the 6th
day of March, 1939, that Exhibit C attached to
plaintiff '·s complaint is a true copy of the notice
served on Mr. and Mrs. Bastian on the 6th day of
April, 1939, and Exhibit D is a true copy of the
·original order discharging the garnishee in the case
of J. S. Peterson v. Gertrude Erickson and waH
served on the defendants on April 6, 1939; that no
payments were made by either of the defendants
to Mrs. Erickson except the payment of $900.00
shown by the bank receipts, Exhibit B. (Tr. 4-6;
Ab. 32).
By the terms of the agreement the defendants
were to pay for the property $14,000.00 a~ follows:
$2,000.00 more or less on or before February 1,
1939, and $1,000.00 payable on February 1 of each
year until the entire sum i·s paid, together with interest at the rate of 4 percent per annum, payable
annually at the time the principal is paid. The defendants also agreed to pay all taxes and aS'sessments against the land and water commencing with
the year 1938. The contract also cont~ined the following provi·sion:
''In the event that the parties of the second
part shall default in the payment of either
principal or interest as above outlined, the
first party shall have the right to re-enter
and take peaceable pos·session of said land
and improvements, and of this agreement
and the warranty deed and all other papers
pertaining to this agreement.''
The agreement was·· prepared by Elsie Eckersley,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clerk of the Di·strict Court of \Y ayne County, and
the agreen1ent, together with the warranty deed to
the pren1i~es was deposited with Mrs. Eckersley as
escrow holder. (Tr. 2; Ab. 31, 18).
All of the foregoing facts are undisputed and
the court found on undisputed testimony that the
defendants have not paid the plaintiff the $2,000.00
payable on February 1, 1939, except this, that the.
defendants paid to the State Bank of Wayne approximately the sum of_ $900.00 to which they were
entitled to credit upon the $2,000.00 payment. The
fact is undi·sputed that the defendants did not pay
the interest or any part thereof upon the principal
sum of $14,000.00, and failed and neglected to pay
the taxes for the year 1938. The contract providea
that the defendants should be allowed 30 days
grace in making the payment of $2,000.00 in the
event their lamb crop or other crops had not been
di·sposed of by February 1 of each year. (Ab. 16).
The court found that on !Yiarch 6, 1939, the plaintiff served upon each of the defendants, personally,
a notice of their default and a demand for the surrender of the premises. This fact is undi·sputed.
Plaintiff, in her complaint in addition to claiming
her right to the possession of the prope.rty for The
defendants' default, also asked for damages and
for the appointment of --a receiver. It was assumed
at the time the complaint was filed that the defendants might fail properly to care for the property, and would take the croP's for 1939 unless the
ca·se could be reached for trial before that time, and
'for thesP reasons it seemed expedient to ask for a
rEceiver.
At the time of trial the plaintiff did not atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tempt to prove the damage alleged in her supple.
mental complaint and prior thereto waived her
application for the appointment of a receiver on
the assurance of an early trial. The defendants'
answer claimed performance according to the
terms of the agreement. No affirmative defense
was made on the ground of any modification of
the agreement, but it was contended tthat because of
the us~ of the words "more or less" following the
provision for the paxment of $2',000.000, there was
no obligation to pay that sum or any other sum
except ·such amount as might be realized from the
~feeding of lambs on the farm during the fall and
winter of 19B8.
The court made findings upon all facts essentially as claimed by the plaintiff with the exception of the occurrences at the time of the negotiations and the conversations of the parties. at the
time the eontract was prepared and signed. The
findings, conclusions, and decree (Tr. 32'; Ab_ 29)
will hereafter be discus·sed more fully with respect
to these controverted matters. The court fir~t
came to the conclusion that because of these occurrence's and conversations the plaintiff was not entitled to the $2,000.00 payment and had waived her
right to repossess. 'rhe court subsequently modjfied its decision re'storing the $2,000.00 payable on
February 1, 1939, but fixed the time of payment
as of February 1, 1940, and decreed that the defendants had fully performed all the terms and con.
ditions of the contract; that plaintiff had waived
her right to reposse·ss, and ordered plaintiff's case
dismiRsed. (Tr. 124-125).
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ARGU~IENT

Appellant has as·signed five errors. Assignment No. 1, that the court erred in making1 its find ...
ing of fact No. 9 wherein the court finds that at the
time of the execution of the agreement there was an
understanding· that if defendants would feed lambs
upon the property, the plaintiff would look to the
net proceeds from the sale of lambs for the first
•payment on said contract to be paid February 1,
1939, and would look to the net proceeds from the
sale of said lambs for the payment of interest at
the rate of 4 percent per annum upon the sum of
$14,000, and erred in finding that for the payment
due on February 1, 1939, the plaintiff assumed the
whole rrsk that the lamb proceeds would pay the
:uuoWit of $2,000.00 and interest and that if the
profits from the feeding of lambs were insufficient
to pay said sum and interest 7 the plaintiff would
waive her right to re-enter and take possession of
the property ;
1,hat the court erred in finding No. 10 wherein the·
court finds that the plaintiff knew the defendants
'had nothing and would have to rely upon the proceeds of the farm and lamb erop for payment upon
the contract, and that plaintiff was willing: to an-d
tiid assume every risk incident to placing all of th~
property including the growing crop in the hands
of the defendants and assumed each and every ri'ok
incident to the feeding of lambs and whether there
would be any profits arising therefrom; and that
the parties in .the use of the words ''more or les·s''
intended thereby to so limit the liability of the defendants, ' that said $2,000.00 ~and interest on
$14,000.00 payable on February 1, 1939, should he
paid at that time only in the event said amount was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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realized as profits from the feeding of lan1hs, and
erred in finding that the defendants fully performed their obligation under said contract by paying
to the plaintiff the profits realized from said lamb
feeding venture; and that the use of the words
''more or le·ss'' following the agreement to pay
$2,000.00 meant and was intended to mean th_at defendants should pay and the plaintiff should accept the profits realized from said lamb feeding·
venture;
~f.'hat

the test4TI-ony and evidence is insufficient to
support said finding, and that there is no evidenee
supporting or reasonably tending to support ·said
findings; and that there is no substantial evidence
showing or rea·sonably tending to show that by thP
uee of the words ''more or less'' the parties intended that the defendants should pay and the plaintiff should accept the profits realized from said
\lamb feeding venture to apply upon said payment
and interest, or that plaintiff would waive her
.right to re-enter and take po·ssession of. said premises upon payment of said amount, and that the
preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary.
In Assignments of Error Nos. 3, 4 and 5 appellant alleges error in· the conclusions of the court in
respect to the same matters referred to in findings
of fact Nos. 9 and 10, and that the conclusions and
decree of the court are contrary to the findings of
the court; _that it appears from the testimony without dispute in said cause that the defendants were
in default in the payment of interest and in the
payment of taxes. The assignments of error fully
set forth the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings; that the findings, conclusions and
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decree are contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence and against law.
Before discussing the assigned errors, it will
uid to refer briefly to the testimony of the parties
regarding the conversations and occurrences prior
to and at the time the contract was prepared and
signed. Mr. and :Mrs. Bastian testified as to the·se
matters suhstantially as follows: That Mrs. Erickson mentioned selling the place to Bastian the day
before the contract was signed (Tr. 51; Ab. 46);
that ·she asked him if he wanted to buy the prop~
erty, and he told her he didn't have anything
to buy with; that she would rather see him get the
place and suggested that he try and get a government loan; that she told him she wanted $14,000.00
for the property; that he later told her he couldn't
get the money; that she told him that Will Taylor
in Fremont and another party wanted the place ;
that a little later Mrs. Erickson sent for him; that he
went to her home, and she said she had been thinking
'it over and had decided to turn everything over to
Bastian if he wanted it with the understanding
that he would feed lambs; that she said whatever
the lamb crop brings I want $1,000.00 or $2,000.00
or whatever they bring and you are able to pay;
that Bastian said, if you want to go down to the
bank and fix it up to that effect, I will take a
chance; that they went to the bank and had Mrs.
Eckersley draw up the contract. ·When she drew
up the contract, she wrote down $2,000.00; that
Bastian mentioned that it was $2,000.00 more or
less. (Tr. 52; Ab. 47). On cross examination Mr. Bastian testified that Mrs. Erickson came down to his
-place and put the proposition up to him and asked
if he wanted to accept it and ·said she had decidea
to let him have the place if he wanted it for
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$14,000.00 and provided that 'he feed lambs; that

he remembered the provision in the_ contract about
money beirtg due to the bank, and that he was to
pay that money and deduct it from the $2,000.00
payment; that he understood he was to pay Mrs
Erickson what the lambs brought. ( Tr. 64-68 ; Ab.
51-52) ; that he told Mrs. Erickson he w()uldn 't sign
any paper ·stipulating $2,000.00, but if she would
put in $2,000.00 more or less, he would sign the
contract.
Mrs. Bastian testified that the first time ·she
talked to Mrs. Erickson was when ·she called at thE.l
Bastian residence in Loa; that this was on the ·same
day the agreement was drawn up; that at that time
1\f.rs. ·Erickson .wanted to ·sell her place and offered
it lo the Bastians providing they would feed lamb~
and tqrn over what was made out of the lamh crop
for the first payment; that the partie·s discussed
the terms of the contract before they went to the
bank; that she was present when the contract was
signed; that at that time a·s nearly as she oould recall they 'agreed to pay "what the lamb crop
brought" (Tr. 88; A b. 58) ; that she understood
~1rs. ~rickson and ~1:r. Bastian had talked about
the property before; that it was agreed $14,000.00
shouldhe paid for the property; that she' offered it
to Mr. and Mrs. Bastian, provided they would rais~
lamhs; that that was about the extent of the conversation; that feeding lambs had been one of the
'm6·st profitable things for the farmers at Loa;
'

:

..

·'

'

Th·at . the parties gave Mrs. Eckersley the . information about how much they were to pay,
and she- wrote all the things down (Tr. 90.Hl; Ab. 59) ; that she· remembered they were
-required to · pay $2,000.00, and . then 4 percent interest oTI. the unpaid balance, and that they
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were to pay the taxes for 1938; that after the contract had been written up, there was a ·suggestion
made to make it $2,000.00 ''more or less' '-because
Mrs. Erickson wanted all that wa:s made out of the
lamb's; that this was agreed upon; that she didn't
know whether the suggestion was made by Mrs.
Erickson or :Mr. Bastian (Tr. 92; Ab. 60); that
\there was a discussion about the contract right
ruter it was completed and they then decided it
would not be a safe thing to write up a contract and
sign it for $2,000.00 when they didn't know what a
lamb crop would bring, but Mrs. Erickson said ·she
wouldn't penalize the Bastians but _would accept
what the lambs brought; that they were willing to
take all the chances and make it whatever they
could; the only condition was, that if they did not
quite make $2,000.00, they would still be able to go
and try to work out; that is what Mrs. Erickson
agreed to do; that they knew Mrs. Erickson had
obligations (Tr. 89; Ab. 58-59).
:Mrs. Erickson testified (Tr. 7-13; Ab. 33-35)
that she had certain conversations with ~Ir. Bastian
about his wanting to purchase the property; that
they had a number of conversations for some period
of time before the contract was signed. The first
conversation was several days before the contract
'was drawn up; that they talked about the place and
the amount Bastian was to pay for it and the
amount he should pay down and the payments he
would make annually; that she went over the farm
with him and looked at the crops; that they agreed
on $14,000.00 for the property and Bastian said he
could not make a down payment until he fed the
crops to the lambs: that he intended to feed lambrs,
and that he would pay $2,000.00 as first payment
and intere'St on the balance of the principal at the
rntr of 4 percent per annum, and that was agreed
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upon; that Mrs. Erickson told him that he could
11ot make it less than that amount if she were to
meet her obligations; that she told him she was
uwing the California Western States Life Insurance
Company and wa:s owing $900.00 and interest to the
State Bank of Wayne; that the obligation to the in:-::urance company was secured by the mortgage on
1b~ farm and the bank s·ecured by a chattel mortgag·e on the personal property; that she told him
she owed J. S. Peterson of Gunnison and George
C. Brinkerhoff, and that these accounts must be
paid out of the $2,000.00; that Bastian said he
·wouldn't pay les·s than that; that he had a beautiful
c1'op of potatoes and would pay $4,000.00 at least
when the first payment was due and at all events
·would pay $2,000.00 and interest so Mrs. Erickson
could meet her obligations; that she turned everything over to him including all of the crops just as
they were on the 25th day of August; that ·she remembered the conversation about the words "more
or less;'' that she asked the question what that
more or less meant, and that Mr. Bastian said that
it didn't mean anything only that if he did fall down
for a few dollars that Mrs. Erickson would accept
it; that he might be a few dollars less than hrs payment, and that Mrs. Erickson wouldn't take the
'property back for this rea·son; that they indicated
to Mrs. Eckersley what they had agreed upon and
it was placed in the contract.
Plaintiff's husband, L. H. Erickson. testified
that he remembered the occasion when Mrs. Erick•son and Mr. Bastian were discussing the contract
for the sale of Mrs. Erickson's farm to ~{r. Bastian; that it was a day or two before the contract
was signed; that they were sitting on the steps of
the porch out from the kitchen facing south, that
he· had been over doing the morning chores at the
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corral and can1e oYer where they were; that as he
came O\'er :Mr. Bastian said ~'I will pay the $2,000.00
and interest on the principal,'' and he throwed hi',:)
hands out to\nlrd the potato patch and said ''I believe I will be able to pay you $4,000.00 and interest'' and then ~Irs. Erickson said "I \vill have to
have $2,000.00 and intere·st on the principal;" that
the next morning· he talked to Mr. Bastian and Bastian said that Ivan (a son of Mrs. Erickson) wanted
$1,000.00 of that money; that he then told Mrs.
Erickson that he did not see how Ivan could expect that because it would take most of the money
to help :Jirs. Erickson meet her obligations. (Tr.
22-23; A b. 38).
Jirs. Eckersley te·stified that she is the County
Clerk of Wayne County; that she typed the agreement at the request of Mrs. Erickson and Mr. Bastian; that they came do·wn to her office and told her
what they wanted in the agreement, and she wrote
all thev told her· that she remembered some of the
discus~ions that' were had at the time the words
"more or le·ss" were placed in the agreement; that
the agreement was \Yritten up complete with
$2,000.00 put in it without the words ''more or less"
before anything wa·s said about the. lamb crop. After
it was written up and read over, the lamb crop was
discussed and she was instructed to put in the words
"more or less" right after the $2,000.00; that she
took aU three copies of the agreement and put each
copy in the machine and wrote in the words ''more
or less'' after they had discussed the matter; that
Mrs. Erickson said ''I do not want to he hard on
you and will put more or less if what you make on
the lamb crop doesn't quite reach the $2,000.00. ''
(Tr. 80-81; Ab. 54-55). On cross examination Mrs.
Erkersley again testified that Mrs. Erickson said
flt n1~ time they were discussing the insertion of the
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words "more or less'' in the contract, that if the
lamb crop didn't come quite up to the $2,000.00, you
will he protected, and that ·she didn't want any
trouble over it; that they were the words she used,
"if the lamb crop doesn't quite come up to
$2,000.00; '' that they were discussing the po·ssibility that Bastian might not be able to make the entire payment, and that is why the words ''more or
les·s" were inserted. ( Tr. 82; _t\.b. 56 ; Tr. 84; A.b.
57).

THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
DEFENDANTS ·WERE NOT IN DEFAUI/1'
BY FAILING TO PAY INTEREST AND
TAXES.
The foregoing testimony does not justify the
findings, conclusions and decree of the court that
there was no default on the part of the defendants in
the performance of the contract or that the words
"more or less"- were U'sed and intended to be used
for the purpose of limiting the liability of the defendants to pay only that sum which should be
realized from the profits ari·sing from the feeding
of lambs, and we submit that that preponderance
of the evidence, when considered in connection with
recognized rules of interpretatons, shows that the
parties did not intend that the Bastians should be
relea·sed from the payment of the $2,000.00 on condition that they pay the profits from the lambs.
The record is without dispute that they did not even
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pay the profits from the lan1bs. This matter will
be ·:mbsequently di~cussed.
This being an equity case~ the court will go be·
hind the findings and weigh all the evidence and
tlecide the issues according to its preponderance.
Corrstitution of Utah, Section 9, Article 8,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section
104-41-23.
Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah 242; 139 Pac. 937.
Utah Commercial Savings Bank v. Faux, 44
Utah 323; 140 Pac. 660.
Little Y. Stringfellow, 46 Utah 576; 151
Pac. 347.
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v.
Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 16 Utah 246;
52 Pac. 168.
vVarner v. Tyng Warehouse Co., 71 Utah
303 ; 2'65 Pac. 748.
McKellar R.eal Estate & Inv. Co. v. Paxton,
62 Utah 97; 218 Pac. 128.
The contract in this ca·se required the defendants to pay to the plaintiff $2,000.00 more or less
on February 1st, 1939 and to pay interest at 4 percent per annum at the time of principal .Payments.
It al·so required the defendants to pay all taxes and
assessments against the land and water commencing
with the year 1938. There is not a ·single word in
:1nybody's testimony from. which the inference
could be drawn that the defendants were to he released from the payment of interest on the prin·
cipal sum if the profits fron1 the lambs were not
sufficient to pay such interest. Neither Mr. or Mrs.
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Bastian made any such claim, nor did they te·stify
to any fact from which such an inference could be
drawn. It is extremely difficult to understand how
the court could make the finding ( Ab. 26) "That
there was an understanding that if the defendants
would feed lambs upon said property, the plaintiff
would look to the net proceeds from the ·sale of said
Lambs ... for the payment of interest at the rate of 4
percent per annum upon the sum of $14,000.00, payable February 1, 1939," or the finding that if the
profits from the lambs was insufficient to pay said
interest, the defendants would be relieved from
such payment or that the plaintiff assumed the
whole risk that the lamb proceeds would be sufficient to pay ·such interest or that by reason of any
conversations or occurrences the plaintiff waived
her right to re-enter and take possession because
of the failure to pay such interest. To make a
finding of fact not supported by any te·stimony
whatsoever, and upon such fact base a conclusion of
law and decree, is in effect to make a new contract
and impair the obligation of the contract. Certainly
no claim will be made, ba:sed upon any fa.ct in evidence in this case, that there is any testimony from
which any inference can be drawn that the defendants' obligation to pay interest on the principa1
sum wa:s contingent in the slightest extent upon the
profits from the feeding of lamb's.
Another proposition equally uncontroverted is
the obligation imposed upon -the defendants to pay
the taxe·s upon the land and water for the year 1938.
(Ab. 29-30). The conclusion of the court that the
defendants were not in default by reason of t~eir
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failure to pay taxes on said property for the year
1938 is contrary to the undisputed evidence.
The court made a finding (No. 6; Ab. 20) that
the defendants did not pay the interest, or any part
thereof, upon the sum of $14,000.00 or upon any
other sum and haYe paid no interest whatsoever,
and that the de-fendants failed and neglec.ted to pay
the taxes upon said property for the year 1938. Notwithstanding such fact, the court concludes (Conclusion No.1; A_b .. 29) that the defendants were not
in default by reason of their failure to pay taxes
for the reason that no definite time was specified
for the payment of said taxes and conclude·s in the
same paragraph that the payment of interest was
contingent upon the succes·s of Bastian's lambfeeding venture. There is not a word of testimony
in support of either of these conclusions, the same
are not only contrary to the evidence, but are not
permissible under the findings. These matters
seem so fundamental from any view of the record
that further argument or citation of authorities
would ·seem wholly unnecessary. It is certainly a
fair construction of this or any contract that where
one of the parties agrees to pay taxes for a certain
year, it means that the taxes shall be paid in that
year or at least shall be paid before the: property is
sold for non-payment. If there was any intention
to the contrary, certainly it doe·s not appear of record in this case.
We submit that the court has improperly conF-trued the contract and failed to give any effecf to
1the evidence or findings in concluding that there
was no default by rea·son of the failure to pay in-·
trrest and taxes.
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rrHE COURT HAS IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED
THEi ,CONTRACT WITH RE8PECT TO
THE USE OF THE WORDS ''1\IOBJE OR
LESS''
The evidenee shows without conflict that when
the parties talked to Mrs. Eckersley about the
agreement, neither Mr. or Mrs. Bastian made any
statement that the February 1st payment was to be
in any way contingent upon profits from feeding
lamb's. Mrs. Eckersley testified that the parties
spent about 15 minutes explaining to her what they
had agreed upon. She then reduced to writing
what they told her. Neither Mr. and :Mrs. Bastian
said anything to l\1rs. Eckersley about the $2,000.00
payment being conting~ent upon lamb profits. If
there was any contingency about the payment of
the $2,000.00 or if tliere had been any agreement of
that kind, certainly JVIr. and Mrs. Bastian would
.have said something about it to Mrs. Eckersley. It
is a good criterion by which to determine what
·occurred before. No suggestion wa:s made as to any
contingency until after the contract had been prepared and the paper~ removed from the typewriter. Then for the first time it was mentioned
by Mr. Bastian (Tr. 52; Ab. 47) that the payment
might be les·s than $2,000.00. The testimony of
~Irs. Eckersley ·supports almost without qualification what Mrs. Erickson said was the substance of
the conversations before the contract was prepared,
and what occurred after the contract had been prepared and the words ''more or less'' added thereto.
Mrs. Eckersley said that Mr. and Mrs. Ba:stian and
1\f rs. Erickson had be~n discussing the agreement
while she was writing it, but after the discus·sion,
Mrs. Erickson said that she didn't want to be hard
on Bastian and would be willing to put in the words
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''mor.e or l~ss'' if what he n1ade on the lamb crop
~lid not quite reach the $2,000.00. Thi·s w·as ~gain
testified to by 1\lt·s. Eckersley on direct examination when she "Tas called as a witnes·s for the defendant and again on cross examination she answered:

Q. All you remember wa·s they were discussing by themselves about lambs fed on
the property 1
·
·
A. Yes, and the pos·sibility that he mig~t
not be able to make the entire payme:o.t, and
that is why the words "more or less" were
inserted.
There is nothing to indicate that the parties intended by \Yhat was said arid done to use the e:xpres'sion "more or less" in any other than its·l>rdinary
meaning. There is nothing which would justify the
c.ourt in giving to the expression a different kind ·of
meaning. The words "more or less" have a rather
well accepted meaning in law. The phrase -is ordinarily used as qualifying the· exact" n-umber of
acres in a piece of land, and the definition of·· the
phrase as thus used is considered as··covering inconsiderable or small differences one way or.. the other.
The fact that the expression here refers· to rrioney
would in no way change the meaning of the terin.
It'S application is discussed in
·
Volume 27, R.C.L. Under Title of Vender
and Purchaser, Section 152, ~s f()lJ.o.ws:

"It iR the general view that this phrase,
or others of like import, added to a state-, ·
ment of quantity can only be considered ·a,s ;,. : :
covering inconsiderable or small differ-··
ences one way or the other and do not in
themselve·s determine the character of the
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sale as one in gross or by the acre. As has
been said the plain and sensible rule is that
when land is sold by the acre as containing
so many acres, 'more or less,' if the quantity on an actual ·survey and estimation,
either overrunning or falling short of the
contents named, be small, no compensation
should be recovered by either party. The
words 'more or les·s' must be intended to
meet such a result. But if the variance be
considerable, the party sustaining the lo·ss
should he allowed for it."
It is further indicated in this section that the
same ~ffect is to be given to the qualification of
the statement of the quantity by such phrases as
'by egtimation' or 'about,' and that the use of such
expressions doe·s not show an absolute contract of
hazard was intended by the parties so as to deny
the right to equitable relief. In
41

c.

J., page 214, the term
follows:

rs defined

as

"Generally in its plain and most obvious
meaning an expression which shows that
the parties were to run the risk of gain or
loss a·s there might happen to be an excess
or deficiency iin the estimated quantity;
words of safety and precaution and intended to cover some slight or unimportant inaccuracy; words used in contracts or conveyances to qualify the representation of quality in such a manner
that, if made in good faith, neither party
should be entitled to any relief on account of deficiency or surplus.'' See Oakes
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v. DeLancy, 30 N .E. 97-±. Also \Vilson v.
Rafter, 17-± S.\V. 137.
There are cases which such terms a:s
'about' and 'more or less' when used in
contracts to qualify the stated quantity or
number are given the meaning of an
approximation with the stated quantity
or number as a fixed basis for such appToxi·mation and there are other cases in which
·such terms are treated as a mere estimate
of an unknown and indefinite quantity or
number which the parties have agreed shall
be the subject matter of the. contract. Each
definition may be soundly applied according
to the intention of the parties which must
be ascertained from all terms of the contract. See :Mosby v. Smith, 186 S. W. 49. ''
We have been unable to find a case where the
IJhrase has been applied following an agreernent to
pay a sum of money but the use of the phrase under
varying situations is discussed in
27 A. L. R. 134, Subdivision 5.
7 A.L.R., page 5, and
70 A.L.R. 368.

No inference, we think, can reasonably be drawn
that the parties intended the words ''more or le~·s''
be given a construction other than their usual and
ordinary meaning and certainly it can not be~
assumed from any te-stimony in this record· that e1e:
parties intended anything different than v;·hat this
language implies. This Court held in the case of
Board of Education v. ·Wright-Osborn(:-.
Co., 49 U. 453; 164 Pac. 1033,
that all the words used in a contract ·must, if possible. be given their usual and ordinary meaning
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and effect, and that it will not be aS'sumed that
l'arties to contracts did not intend what their language implies.
And in the case of
Cmnmings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157; 129
Pac. 619, the Court ·said:
''In determining the meaning that should
be given to language used in an agreement
in order to ascertain the intention of the
parties, all the words or terms used must
be given their ordinary and usual effect,
when considered in the light of the subjectmatter and the nature of the agreement.''
In the ca-se of
Allen v. Bissinger, 62 Utah 226; 219 Pac.
539,
the Court quotes with approval the following language from

13 C.J. 265:
"The apparent mutual assent of the parties, es·sential to the formation of a contract~ must be gathered from the language
employed by them, and the law imputes to
a person an intention corresponding to the
reasonable meaning of its words and acts.
It judges of his intentions by his outward
expressions and excludes all questions in
regard to his unexpressed intention. If
his words or acts, judged by a rea·sonahle
standard, manifest an intention to agree
to the matter in question, that aggreement
is establi·shed, and it is immaterial what
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may be the real but unexpressed state of
his mind upon the subject.''
In the case of
Murphy v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 295;
236 Pac. 680, the Court said:
''Contracts are prepared and entered into
for the convenience and protection of the
parties, and unless waived the courts are
bound to enforce them in accordance with
the intention as the ·same is manifested by
the language used by the parties to the
contract.''
To the same effect see
12 A. J ur., Title Contracts, page 768, Section 236:
"Words will be given their ordinary meaning when nothing appears to show that
they are used in a different sense and no
unreasonable or absurd consequences will
result from doing so. Words cho·sen by
the contracting parties should not be unnaturally forced beyond their ordinary
meaning or given a curious, hidden sense
which nothing but the exigency of a hard
case and the ingenuity of a trained and
acute mind can discover.''

THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE
CONTRACT.
We respectfully submit that within recognized
ro]es of construction the contract is neither ambiguou~ or uncertain. However, no objection was
interposed to the introduction of parol testimony
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t('nding to show the occurences prior to the ex~
ecution of the contract. The plaintiff first testified
with respect to these occurrences, and no complaint
could now be made that error was committed by the
court in permitting such testimony. It i·s contended, however, that ·such oral testimony does not
show an intention to pay any considerable sum less
than $2,000.00) las the February 1, 1939 payment.
Respondents do not contend, or at least no contention was made at trial or in the pleadings, that the
:contract was in any way modified. Their claim
is that they have performed the contract, not because of actual payment, not because of any modiillication of the contract, but because of the construction that respondents contend should be given
to the contract and the use of the words ''more or
les·s.'' ·we think the testimony shows without serL
ous conflict that there was no conversation or occurrence which justifies respondents' contention
in this regard. The testimony oi the plaintiff and
the defendants as to what occurred prior to the time
of the preparation o£ the contract may have been
colored. We must have in mind their interest in the
outcome of the litigation. A good yardstick by
:which to test the testimony of either party as to
what occurred before they reached the office of
Mrs. Eckersley is what they told her to place in the
e;ontract. The entire agreement wa·s discussed and
prE:pared without a word being said by either of the
defendants that the obligation to pay $2',000.00 on
February 1, 1939, was in any way contingent upon
the ability of Mr. Ba·stian to make profits from
feeding lambs. If there had been such conversations or occurrences as were testified to by Mr. and
(~frs. Bastian, certainly in the course of ordinary
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thing about it, and there would, at that time, have
been included in the contract some limitation upon
that liability or son1e intin1ation that the payment
of said amount was contingent. There was nothing
said concerning ·such contingency, nor was anything
added to the contract after it had been prepared
whieh created such contingency.
The testimony of nlrs. Eckersley fully ·supports
the testimony of ~Irs. Erickson that the only COlltingency of any kind was the po·ssibility that M.r.
Bastian's lamb profits might leave him short a small
~mount in discharging the entire $2,000.00 obligation and only in thi·s event, could Bastian avoid a
default.
If we are to go beyond the terms of the con"'"
'tract, and construe it in the light of the testimony
without giving effect to the foregoing rule of construction, we submit that there can be little question
as to the actual intention of the parties. It would
be repetitious again to call the Court's attention to
the testimony of the various witnesses and what
occurred prior to and at the time of the making and
execution of the contract. We submit that this testimony clearly ·shows that the parties intended to
excuse the defendants only in the event that thb
amount paid on February 1, 1939, or within the
grace period of the contract, should be a ·sum only
slightly less than the required payment of $2,000.00.
In construing the contract resort must he had
not only to the testimony but to all the provisions
of the agreement. The seventh paragraph of the
contract provides that the defendants shall be allowed thirty days grace in making the payments
in the event their lamb crop or other crops can not
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be disposed of by February 1st of each year. This
grace period was for the benefit and protection of
the defendants, not that they might pay less than
$~,000.00, but that they would be protected in the
payment of ths amount later than February 1st if
their lamb crop or other crops had not been disposed of. There is no intimation in this paragraph,
placed therein for the benefit of the defendants, that
it the profits from the lambs did not equal or exoeed a sum ·sufficient to pay $2,000.00, that they
would be relieved from payment at that time. If
there had been any such intention, or if in the use of
the words ''more or less'' the parties had in mind
what the defendants now claim, certainly something
would have been said about it in thi·s provision of
tlje contract. It is significant that when this provision of the contract was prepared, no conclusion
had been reached by Mr. Bastian whether he would
or would not feed lambs, and he was free to dispose
of the crop on the farm in any way that he might
choose, but if he had not disposed of it by February
1st, he wa·s then granted an additional grace period
of thirty days before he would be in default.
It also clearly appears that the defendants were
fully advised concerning the obligatioll's of Mrs.
Erickson. Her testimony is to the effect that she
fully advised the defendant·s as to the various obligations that she was owing, and that she would be
unable to meet these obligations unless the full
su1n of $2,000.00 was paid. The defendants admit
that they knew of her obligation on the first mortgage held by the California We·stern States Life
Insurance Company; that they knew of her obligation to the State Bank of ·Wayne for $900.00, and.in
view of this situation the parties provided in paragraph 11 of the contract that the defendants would
pay this obligation and deduct the an1ount of ·such
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payment from the $2,000.00 due on February 1st
and then provided specifically ''payment to bank to
be made out of the 1938 crop on land." There is
no ambiguity or uncertainty in this provision of
the contract; no construction of its terms is necessary. It clearly appears that the parties intended
that the crops on the farm would be used to pay the
February payment of $2,000,00.
Mrs. Erickson was to be- protected by such
application of the crops and no obligation was imposed upon the defendants to feed the crop to
lambs.
~Irs. Erickson would naturally want some
protection a·~ to the value of the crops already produced, and nlr. Bastian would ordinarily have no
objection to a provision so manifestly fair. Crops
had been produced upon the property of the reasonable market value at the time po·ssession was delivered to the defendants in the amount of $1500:00,
and certainly l\1:rs. Erickson would insist upon a
payment of that amount plus some additional sum
to cover the use and occupation of her new modern
five-room home, the value of the use of· the personal
property and the reasonable value of the marketable livestock. We ·submit that it is an inconsistent construction to say as the court found in finding No. 9:
''That the plaintiff assumed the whole
risk that the lamb proceeds would pay the
full amount of $2,000.00 and interest, and
in the event that the profits from the feeding of lambs wa~s insufficient to pay said
sum of $2,000.00 and interest, the plaintiff
agreed to and did waive her right to reenter and take posseS'sion of said prop~
erty."
Such finding we submit is not only contrary to
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trary to the great preponderance of the evidence
when viewed in the light of the circumstances under which the contract was made. We ask-what
fact is there in thi·s case on which the oourt could
find an intention on the part of either of the parties that the defendants should sell or feed all of
the crops, ·should have the benefit and comfort of
the plaiJ!tiff 's home; use all the personal property,
have the income of the milk cows, market the hogs,
dnd otherwise enjoy the benefits of other property
delivered by plaintiff to the defendants, and when
called upon to answer to the performance of the
agreement, be excused therefrom by the simple
a·ssertion that in the use of the words "more or
~ess,'' the parties intended that the plaintiff should
Emffer the entire los·s and assume all the risks and
hazards of a venture to be conducted by the defend.
ants and over which the plaintiff had no control.
The decision in this ca·se has not only deprived
the plaintiff of her crops and her property for the
Pntire year of 1939, hut it has deprived her of the
crops and the use of her property for the year 1940.
She ha·s been placed in a position as shown by cbe
exhibits in this case (Exhibit C; Tr. 130-132) where
the first mortgage on her property has become delinquent a~1d attorneys employed to foreclO'se said
mortgage, and she has yet an obligation to Mr.
Brinkerhoff upon which a foreclosure was pending
at the time of the trial of this action. (RJeporter'·s
Tr. 20).
This Court in the case of
Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207; 143 Pac.
234,
eonsidered and construed an option to purchase
land and had occa·sion to lay down certain cardinal
rules in the construction of contracts where because
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of ambiguity or uncertainty resort was had to parol
testimony. It was held that where the language of
a contract is ciear and all of its terms are explicH
and certain, it is not open to construction; that all
~f the words and expre'Ssions used by the parties
IliUSt be given full force and effect, unless to do so
leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the manifest purpose or intention of the parties; that the
intention of the parties must be determined from
the language used when applied to the subjectmatter and the surrounding circumstances and conditions.
And in the case of
Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69; 106 Pac.
945,
where the Court construed an option to purcha-se
a copper mine, the Court held that where the exact meaning of a written contract is in doubt, as
where the language used is contradictory and obscure, and there are two interpretations possible,
one of which establrshes a comparative1y equitable
contract and the other, an unconscionable one, tne
former should prevail.
Makris v. Malis, 50 Utah 544; 167 Pac.
802.
The Court in this ca·se construed a contract for tha
sale of shares of stock in a corporation and held
that in construing a written contract it i·s the duty
'of the court to consider all the terms and the rerJationship of the parties existing at the time the
concontract was made, and if possible, to arrive at
their intent. And in
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah
343; 231 Pac. 107,
the Court considers at length rules of interpretation to be applied in determining the intention of
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the parties to written contracts. The Court quotes
with approval from the case of
Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 462,
where the following language was used by the
Court:
''The purpo·se of a written contract is to
evidence the terms on which the minds of
the parties to it met when they made it, and
the ascertainment of those terms, and the
·sense in which the parties to the agreement used them when they agreed to them
is the great desideratu1n and the true end
of all contractual interpretation. The express terms of an agreement may not be
abrogated, nullified, or modified by parol
te·stimony; but, when their construction or
extent is in question, the meaning of the
terms upon which the minds of the parties
met when they settled them, and their
intention in using them, must he ascertained, and, when ascertained/ they must
prevail in the interpretation of .the agreement, however broad or narrow the words
in which they are expressed. In the discovery of this meaning, the intention, the
situation of the parties, and facts and circumstances which surrounded and necessarily influenced them when they made their
contract, the reasonableness of the re·spective claims under it, and, above all,
the subject-matter of the agreement and
the purpose of its execution, are always
conducive to, and often as es·sential and
controlling- in, the true interpretation of
the contract as the mere word~ of its various ·stipulationR. These are rules for the
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construction of contracts 'rhich commend
themselves to the reason and are established by repeated decisions of the court's,
and they n1ust not be permitted to escape
attention in the consideration of the contract which this case presents. Accumulator Co. v. Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 64 F.
70, 74; 12 C.C.A. 37, 41, 42; 27 U.S. App.
364, 372. ''
The Court in this case held that extrinsic evidence
may not be admitted to affect, vary, add to, or
modify written instrument, but is admis·sible to
show the true intention of parties, if the languagE\
of the instrument is obscure, uncertain or ambiguous; and that unless provisions of a contract
are clearly independent, distinct and ·severable, all
terms and provisions must be construed together.

PL.Al_:NTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO REPOSSESS
FOR DEFENDANTS' DEFAULT.
The contract contains the following provision:
"In the event that the parties of the second part shall default in the payment of
either principal or interest as above outlined, the first party ·shall have the right
to re-enter and take peaceable possession
of said land and improvement's, and of
this agreement and the warranty deed and
all other papers pertaining to this agreement."
Respondents have made no claim that appellant wa·s not entitled to repossess if they were in
dPfault. Their answer (Ab. 11) admits the contntet as pleaded but ''deny that they have violated
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any of the covenants in said agreement and contend
that they have paid according to the terms of the
agreement and that they are not in default in the
performance of any of the terms of said contract,"
1t.md allege that the plaintiff herself has violated the
terms of the agreement, and set forth in paragraph
6 a claimed specific violation of the agreement in
t.llat ·Mrs. Erickson gave a mortgage to J. S. Peterson to secure the payment of an obligation for
$231.61. (Ab. 26). They deny that the respondents'
.Jecupation of the premises h; wrongful or unlawful
or contrary to the terms of the agreement. We can
-3ee no issue upon the right of the plaintiff to repO'ssess if it is determined that plaintiff was entitled to the $2,000.00 payment on February 1,
1939, or· substantially that amount less, of course,
the sum of $900.00 paid by the defendant·s on behalf of the plaintiff to the State Bank of Wayne.
The amount of the default on March 1, 1939, was
the balance of the $2,000.00 amounting to $1,100.00,
interest on $14,000.00 amounting to $280.00: and
taxe·s. vVhen the amount of the default is considered in connection with the value of crops and
other property delivered to the defendants, repossession would certainly not be inequitable, and
would not amount to the imposition of a penalty.
'l'he pure and simple issue, therefore, is perform~
ance v. non-performance. The right of the plainHff to declare a forfeiture and to reposse·ss is
established by the decision of thi-s Court in the case
of
Imlay v. Bubier, 77 Utah 547; 298 Pac.
383.
Whatever uncertainty existed in this State arising
out of prior decisions, was settled by the ImlayBuhler case. The plaintiff there brought his action
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to reco,'er for the unpaid purchase price of real
estate. There was a provision in the contract as
follows:
But in case default be made in said payments or either of them or the taxe·s should
not have been paid each year by the second party on the land and water rights
herein de-scribed, then this contract shall
become null and void and the rights and
interests of said purchaser shall be declared forfeited and the party of the first
part shall have the right to re-enter and
take possession of said property without
recourse to law.
The Court distinguishes the Cooley, Garn and Richards cases, _refers to the leading ca:se of Wilcoxson
v. Stitt, which holds that such provisions are for
the benefit of the vendor and concludes this phase
of the decision in the following language:
"It further rs to be noted that in both the
Rose and Cooley cases this Court recognized and approved the well-settled doctrine that as a general proposition forfeiture clauses of contracts of the character
considered by this Court are for the benefit of the vendor and not of the vendee,
and that, on default of payments and noncomplianc~ with the terms of the contract
by the vendee, the vendor ordinarily has a
choice of several remedies. He at hi·s election may (1) specifically enforce the contract, or (2') sue at law to recover the purchase price remaining due, or (3) re-enter
and take posse·ssion of the lands and recover damages for the breach of contract.
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The contract here was not a mere option
to purchase. It was one where the plaintiff agreed to sell and the defendant to
purcha:se the real estate and water right
at an agreed price which the defendant
promised and agreed to pay as by the terms
of the contract provided, and where he as
well as the plaintiff was required to perform the covenants and conditions respectively imposed on each and as by the terms
of the contract provided. We thus are of
the opinion that the plaintiff had the right
to maintain the action and to enforce the
contract as was done, and that the demurrers were properly overruled; and, inasmuch as the defendant by his answer admitted the execution of the contract and
expressly admitted that he had failed to
make the payments as alleged in the complaint and a:s provided by the contract,
judgment on the pleadings, was properly
granted."
Nor is there any merit in the defense that
r.Iaintiff violated her contract by giving a mortgage to J. S. Peterson. The obligation due to J. S.
Peterson w~s one of the account·s that Mrs. Erickson told Mr. Bastian must be paid out the $2,000.00.
J. S. Peterson had a judgment against Mrs. ErickfOn and had a writ of garnishment issued and
served upon the defendant Ba:stian. By this writ
the ~astians were required not to pay money due
and owing to Mrs. Erickson. In order to release
this writ of garnishment and to satisfy the claim
of Mr. Peterson, the plaintiff gave Mr. Peterson a
mortgage and procured a release of the writ of
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garnishment. This release garnishment was 'Served
on the defendants on April 3, 1939, (Ab. 5).
The rule of law relating to incumbrances on
land sold by a vendor is stated in
Sections 437-438, 66 C. J., Title Vend or
an4 Purchaser, as follows:
''Generally, however, to justify rescission
on the ground of encumbrances, it must
appear that the vendee contracted for a
title free of encumbrances ; that he neither
knew or was chargeable with knowledge
of the encumbrance; that the alleged encumbrance is ·so in fact, is valid and legal,
that it cannot be removed before the vendor is bound to convey, or before the offer
of the purchaser to rescind, or has not been
removed before decree in the suit to rescind, and that the vendor would not have
removed it if the purchaser had been willing to complete the contract. The mere existence of a mortgage does not justify rescission of an installment contract where
provision is made for discharge of the
mortgage when the time for completion of
the contract arrives, nor may the purcha·ser rescind where the charge on the
property is less than the unpaid purchase
money and may be set up as a defense pro
tanto in an action to recover therefor.''
Section 438. Rule in United State·s.
''The American decisions have uniformly
held that the vendor cannot he placed in
default for defect of title or inability to·
convey, by tender of performance by the
purchaser and demand for performance by
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the vendor before the expiration of the
time fixed by the contract for ~airing a.
conveyance, unless the nature of the defect
is such that the vendor cannot acquire
title.''
DEFENDAN'rS WERE IN
THEIR OWN THEORY.

DEFAULT

ON

The terstimony of Arthur Brian, cashier of the
State Bank of Wayne ( Tr. 9:5-102; A b. 61-62;; Tr.
115-118; Ah. 67-68), shows that Bastian received
from the sale of lambs $373.6.04; that he paid out
the following items: Purchase price of lamb.~,
$1900.00; feed advances, $463.00. Total $2363.00;
that he paid to the hank on behalf qf Mrs. Erickson, $900.00 principal, $53.91 interest; total expenditures $3316.91, leaving a profit growing out
of the lamb-feeding venture of $419.13. It wa:3
further claimed, however, that Bastian paid 25c per
head for freight o·n the lambs which was not paid
by or through the bank. No showing was made,
however, a.s to how many head of lambs were
shipped, but there were 500 originally purchased.
( 1,r. 59 ; Ah. 49). On the assumption that as many
were shipped out as were originally bought., the
freight would not exceed $125.00, so that it is manifestly apparent that Bastian did not even pay to
Mrs. Erickson the amount realized as profits. Howlver, Mr. Bastian claimed that he had paid some
of :.Mrs. Erickson's hills and upon payment deposited the receipts with Mrs. Eckersley as escrow
l1older. Therse bills were stipulated (Reporter's
Tr. 5; Ab. 32) as follows:
Charles Taylor, $40.00 which Taylor claimed
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fore Bastian took pm:;~e~siou of the property; $10.20
for a blacks1nith bill claimed to be due fron1 l\'lrs .
.bJrickson to ~lyron Guyn1on; $4.50 for a clahn of
hack asses·s1nents on water tap; and $UJ.OO on an
alleged old account of the People'~ Light & Power
Company. The total of these bills anwunts to
$73.70, ·still leaving· a profit not paid to ~lrs. Erickson of $220.43. There was no authority for Mr.
Bastian to pay any accounts of Mrs. Erickson and
he would not be entitled to any credit for so doing.
\Ye submit that the record i·s without any substantial dispute that the defendants did not even comply with what they clain1ed their agreement was,
and that the finding of the court to the effect tha.t
the defendants had paid to the plaintiff all of thf
profits ari~ing from the feeding of lambs is not
supported by the evidence and in fact is contrary
to the undisputed evidence.
We respectfully submit that the contract in
this case has been improperly construed; that a
very ·serious injustice has resulted to the appellant. The facts show a very great and unjust enrichment of the respondents at the expense of the
appellant; that the judgment should be reversed
with directions to the District Court of W avne
County to enter a decree for the repossession. of
all of the appellant's property and a forfeiture of
all of the rights of respondents under the contract
of purchase and an accounting by the respondentS\
for all of the crops produced in the year 1940.
Respectfully submitted,

A. H. HOUGAARD,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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